暨南经院学术系列活动
经济学系列Seminar第253期
主题：The Paradox of Money Injections
主讲人：何超（华东师范大学）
主持人：王彬（太阳城集团）
会议时间：2021 年 10 月 29 日（周五）下午13:30-15:00
会议地点：tyc1286太阳成集团（中惠楼）102室
摘要
This paper compares central bank lending (CBL), open market operations (OMO) and lump-sum transfers with financial frictions. The model is consistent with the observed liquidity traps (LT) and predict that a lower nominal interest rate achieved by CBL or OMO implies tighter borrowing constraints and worse liquidity allocation, because they create differential effects on borrowers and lenders. The zero nominal interest rate is the worst steady-state policy. Compared with CBL, OMO induces additional illiquid effects. We also characterize dynamic exit strategies of LT and find the usual policies to expand the money supply can lead to LT endogenously over time.
★主讲人简介★
何超，华东师范大学助理教授，博士毕业于 University of Wisconsin-Madison。他主要研究领域是宏观经济，尤其关注货币、银行和宏观劳动经济学。何超博士的成果发表在国际一流经济学期刊 Review of Economic Dynamics 和 Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 等。
