主题：All Pay Quality-Bids in Score Procurement Auctions
主讲人：吕景峰 新加坡国立大学
主持人：康明石 太阳城集团
时间：2023年12月11日（周一）下午15:00
地点：太阳城集团石牌校区tyc1286太阳成集团大楼（中惠楼）102室
摘要
We study score procurement auctions with all-pay quality bids, in which a supplier's score is the difference between his quality and price bids. Equilibrium quality and price bids are solved without first obtaining the corresponding equilibrium scores. In particular, our approach accommodates the case with a minimum score requirement. When the convex effort cost function takes a power form, a higher all-pay component of the quality bid reduces quality provision, total surplus, and suppliers' payoffs, but may increase or decrease the procurer's payoff. If the procurer reimburses the all-pay components of losing suppliers or all suppliers, this would increase quality provision and suppliers' payoffs, but reduce total surplus and the procurer's payoff. Finally, we rely on our approach to identify the procurer-optimal score rule, which is quasi-linear in quality and price. Relative to the procurer's payoff function, the optimal score rule values quality less, and the score rule function increases in quality at a lower rate than the procurer's payoff function. When supplies' type distribution has a weakly convex reverse hazard rate, the optimal score rule is more responsive to quality or values the quality more when the quality bid gets more costly.
主讲人简介
Jingfeng Lu is a professor at the National University of Singapore. He is mainly an applied theorist working on auctions, contests, and mechanism design. He is also interested in empirics in auctions and contests. His papers have appeared in many well-respected journals, including the American Economic Review, Journal of Economic Theory, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, International Economic Review, RAND Journal of Economics, Journal of Public Economics, Games and Economic Behavior, and Economic Theory. He is currently an associate editor for the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization and the Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design.
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校对|孙兰
责编|麦嘉杰
初审|黄振
终审发布|郑贤
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